Baltimore, Md., April l9, 1861.
6th Massachusetts Infantry.

The authorities at Washington had become alarmed for the safety of the national capital. It was flanked on one side by Virginia, on the other by Maryland. Richmond was the heart of the secession movement and Baltimore was a volcano under which smouldered the fires of revolt. Washington was the objective point of newly organized U.S. forces. To reach it, Baltimore must be passed. On this date the 6th Mass. regiment, about 1,000 men, commanded by Col. Jones, passed through the city. Accompanying the train that brought it were about 1,200 unarmed soldiers from Philadelphia under Col. Small. The want of precaution for the latter's safety showed how slight was the apprehension of danger. Singularly enough, it was on the anniversary of the battle of Lexington that the stones which had echoed to the feet of the brave defenders of Washington in 1814 were to resound to the tread of Americans attacked and killed by Americans as they hastened to the defense of their national capital. After leaving Philadelphia, Jones received an intimation that there would be trouble in Baltimore. He immediately provided for the distribution of ammunition, the loading of arms, and issued the following order: "The regiment will march through Baltimore in column of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front and pay no attention to the mob, even if they throw stones, bricks or other missiles; but if you are fired upon and anyone of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may see aiming at you and be sure you drop him." But Jones was proposing and Baltimoreans were disposing. They had decided that his men should not march through the open streets. As soon as the train reached Baltimore the cars were uncoupled, horses were hitched to them and singly, each with its human freight, they were driven rapidly across the city. After the cars containing 7 companies had reached the Washington depot, the track behind them was barricaded. Cars containing companies C, D, I and L, and the musicians were vacated. The band dispersed, the troops formed and began their march through the mob. They were immediately attacked by a shower of missiles that came faster as they proceeded. Their officers urged them to a double quick, and their evident haste was accepted by the mob as evidence either that they were afraid or that they were without ammunition. Pistol shots were fired into their ranks and one soldier fell dead. The order to fire was now given and it was promptly obeyed. Several of the mob fell and the soldiers hastened their advance. Mayor Brown of Baltimore placed himself at the head of the column beside Capt. Follansbee, who had been chosen to lead it, assured that officer that he would protect the troops and besought him to keep them from firing. Before he had marched far, however, other missiles fell and his patience with the mob gave out. Seizing a musket from the grasp of a soldier, he fired at and brought down one of the rioters, and a policeman who was at the head of the column shot another. There the mayor's personal participation in the melee began and ended. Police marshal (Chief) Kane with about 50 policemen at this juncture rushed to the rear of the column, formed a line across the street, and with drawn revolvers checked the mob while the troops got to the depot. About 130, including the band and field musicians, were missing. As the men went into the cars Jones caused the blinds at the windows be closed and took precautions to prevent even seeming offence to the people of Baltimore, but still the missiles came thick and fast into the train and it was only with the utmost difficulty that he prevented the soldiers from leaving it and avenging the death of their comrades. After a volley of stones a soldier fired and killed a man who had been seen to hurl a missile into the car. Obstructions were placed on the track to delay the departure of the train, but they were removed by the police. Meantime the city authorities learned that the Pennsylvania troops had arrived at the Philadelphia depot, unaware of what had occurred and intending to march through the streets. The marshal of police hastened thither and as it was impossible for the troops, unarmed though they were, to cross the town without a general and bloody conflict he protected them with a force of police until they were sent back by rail to Havre de Grace. But they were not permitted to leave without a hostile demonstration by a part of the exultant mob as it returned from the pursuit of the Massachusetts regiment. These scenes were enacted between 10 a.m. and 12 noon. Five of the 6th Massachusetts were killed, 7 were too severely wounded for removal, about 30 wounded were taken to Washington. The city of Baltimore sent to claimants the bodies of the soldiers who were killed and cared for the wounded who were left there.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

********************************************************************************** APRIL 19, 1861.
Conflict between United States troops and mob in Baltimore, Md., and interruption of communication through that city with Washington.

REPORTS, ETC.
No. 1.--Col. Edward F. Jones, Sixth Massachusetts Militia.
No. 2.--Board of Baltimore Police Commissioners.
No. 3.--Hon. George William Brown, Mayor of Baltimore.
No. 4.--Message of the Mayor of Baltimore.
No. 5.--Statement of George M. Hill (Hill in error should be Gill).

No. 1. Report of Col. Edward F. Jones, Sixth Massachusetts Militia. HDQRS. 6TH REGIMENT, 3RD BRIG., 2D DIV., M. V. M., Capitol, Washington, April 22, 1861.

In accordance with Special Orders, No. 6, I proceeded with my command towards the city of Washington, leaving Boston on the evening of the 17th April, arrived in New York on the morning of the 18th, and proceeded to Philadelphia, reaching that place on the same evening.

On our way John Brady, of Company H, Lowell, was taken insane, and deeming it unsafe to have him accompany the regiment, I left him at Delanco, N. J., with J. C. Buck, with directions that he should telegraph Mayor Sargent, of Lowell, as to the disposition of him, and we proceeded thence to Baltimore, reaching that place at noon on the 19th. After leaving Philadelphia I received intimation that our passage through the city of Baltimore would be resisted. I caused ammunition to be distributed and arms loaded, and went personally through the cars, and issued the following order, viz:

The regiment will march through Baltimore in column of sections, arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and, perhaps, assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front, and pay no attention to the mob, even if they throw stones, bricks, or other missiles; but of you are fired upon and any one of you is hit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire into any promiscuous crowds, but select any man whom you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.

Reaching Baltimore, horses were attached the instant that the locomotive was detached, and the cars were driven at a rapid pace across the city. After the cars containing seven companies had reached the Washington depot the track behind them was barricaded, and the cars containing band and the following companies, viz: Company C, of Lowell, Capt. Follansbee; Company D, of Lowell, Capt. Hart; Company I, of Lawrence, Capt. Pickering, and Company L, of Stoneham, Capt. Dike, were vacated, and they proceeded but a short distance before they were furiously attacked by a shower of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They increased their steps to double-quick, which seemed to infuriate the mob, as it evidently impressed the mob with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order "Fire" was given, and it was executed. In consequence, several of the mob fell, and the soldiers again advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed himself at the head of the column beside Capt. Follansbee, and proceeded with them a short distance, assuring him that he would protect them, and begging him not to let the men fire; but the mayor's patience was soon exhausted, and he seized a musket from the hands of one of the men and killed a man therewith, and a policeman, who was in advance of the column, also shot a man with a revolver.

They at last reached the cars, and they started immediately for Washington. On going through the train I found there were about one hundred and thirty missing, including the hand and field music. Our baggage was seized, and we have not as yet been able to recover any of it. I have found it very difficult to get reliable information in regard to the killed and wounded, but believe there were only three killed, viz:

James Keenan, Company L, Stoneham.
Daniel Stevens, Company D, Lowell.
Edward Coburn, Company D, Lowell.

Wounded.

Capt. J. H. Dike, Stoneham, dangerous; doing well.
Andrew Robbins, Stoneham, dangerous; doing well.
S. H. Needham, Lawrence, dangerous; doing well.
Michael Green, Lawrence; flesh wound.
D. B. Tyler, Lowell; condition unknown.
Edwin Colley, Lowell; condition unknown.
H. W. Danforth, Stoneham; condition unknown.
William R. Patch, Lowell; condition unknown.

(NOTE.--The list in this letter is, of course, inaccurate. James Keenan is a cripple. Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, and Addison O. Whitney and Luther C. Ladd, of Lowell, were the killed.--ADJUTANT-GENERAL of Massachusetts. October 23, 1874.)

Capt. Dike is in the hands of some brother Masons, and to the Order he owes his life. The others are supposed to be at Baltimore Infirmary.

The following were brought with us and sent to the hospital here:

Gordon Reed, Company A; since discharged.
Alonzo Joy, Company B; doing well.
G. G. Durrell, Company I; since discharged.
Victor Dengras, Company I; doing well.
W. G. Withington, Company D; since discharged.
W. H. Young, Company L; doing well.
Warren Holden, Company L; doing well.
Maurice Mead, Company L; doing well.
George Alexander, Company D; doing well.
C. L. Gill, Company L; doing well.
Charles Stinson, Company C; doing well.
J. M. Moore, Company D; since discharged.
J. W. Pennell, Company L; doing well.
E. A. Perry, Company L; since discharged.
William G. Butterfield, Company L; doing well.
Stephen Flanders, Company L; doing well.
J. W. Kimpton, Company L; doing well.
John Fortier, Company L; doing well.
C. H. Chandler, Company D; doing well.
S. S. Johnson, Company L; since discharged.
Henry Dike, Company L; doing well.
J. F. Rowe, Company L; doing well.
Daniel Brown, Company L; doing well.
George Calvin, Company C; doing well.
H. Gardner, Company C; doing well.
S. L. Colley, Company L; doing well.
W. D. Gourley, Company C; doing well.
John Swett, Company A; doing well.
W. H. Lamson, Company D; doing well.
G. W. Lovering, Company D; doing well.
William M. Holden, Company C; doing well.

As the men went into the cars I caused the blinds to the cars to be closed, and took every precaution to prevent any shadow of offense to the people of Baltimore; but still the stones flew thick and fast into the train, and it was with the utmost difficulty that I could prevent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging the death of their comrades.

After a volley of stones some one of the soldiers fired and killed a Mr. Davis, who I have since ascertained by reliable witnesses threw a stone into the car; yet that did not justify the firing at him, but the men were infuriated beyond control. On reaching Washington we were quartered at the Capitol, in the Senate Chamber, and are all in good heart and spirits.

I have made every effort to get possession of the bodies of our comrades, but have not yet succeeded. Should I succeed I shall forward them to Boston, if practicable; otherwise shall avail myself of a kind offer of George Woods, esq., who has offered me a prominent lot in the Congressional burying-ground for the purpose of interment.

We were this day mustered into the United States service, and will forward the rolls at first opportunity after verification.
EDWARD F. JONES, Col. Sixth Regiment, M. V. M., in service of United States.
Brigade Maj. WILLIAM H. CLEMENCE.

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No. 2.
Extracts from report of the Baltimore Police Commissioners.
OFFICE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Baltimore, May 3, 1861.

To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland: The board of police of the city of Baltimore, created and appointed by your honorable body by the provisions of the fourth article of the Code of Public Local Laws, section 806, &c., deem it their duty respectfully to report:
* * * * *
The board continued from the date of their above report to exercise their regular functions until Friday, the 19th April. On that day a large detachment of, it is understood, about 1,800 men of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Militia arrived in the forenoon in the city via the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad. No member of the board of police had any information that these troops were expected on that day until form half an hour to one hour of the time at which they were to arrive. The marshal of police was immediately notified, and called out at once a large portion of his force to preserve order during their transit through the city. When they arrived, there were manifestations to interfere with their passage; and after some had been transported by cars through the streets to the Washington depot obstructions were placed on the track in the city which stopped the progress of the remainder. These alighted to march to the depot, and to prevent any difficulty the mayor himself at their head, and they thus proceeded on their route. Missiles were injured. Their assailants were fired upon, and in some instances with fatal effect. An intense and irrepressible feeling appeared to be at once aroused, and repeated conflicts between parties of citizens and the Massachusetts troops took place, several being killed on both sides.

The marshal, who had been on active duty at the Camden-street depot, and did not know that these troops were on their route or expected, hearing of this, hastened to meet them with a force of the police, and under their escort they reached the Washington depot, and after some delay the train finally started for Washington. Attempts were made to hinder it by placing obstructions on the track of the railroad, but by the interference of the police these were soon removed.

The city authorities were meanwhile informed that there had been another arrival of military, who were then at the Philadelphia depot. The marshal of police hastened to that point, and as it was impossible for them at that time to be taken through the streets without a general and bloody conflict, he protected them with a party of his police until they were sent back by the railroad company in the cars to Havre de Grace.

During the afternoon and night a large number of stragglers from some of the above detachments of troops sought the aid and protection of the police; they were safely cared for at the several station-houses, and were sent off in security by the earliest opportunity to Havre de Grace or Philadelphia on the cars.

The same night the board had a meeting, when the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was utterly impossible form the state of the public mind that any more forces form other States could, by any probability, then pass through the city to Washington without a fierce and bloody conflict at every step of their progress, and that whatever might be the result, great loss of life and imminent danger to the safety of the city would necessarily ensue. The board were equally unanimous in their judgment that, as good citizens, it was their duty to the city, and to the State of Maryland, to adopt any measures whatsoever that might be necessary at such a juncture to prevent the immediate arrival in the city of further bodies of troops from the Eastern or Northern States, though the object of the latter might be solely to pass through the city. It was suggested that the most feasible, if not the most practicable, mode of thus scoping for a time the approach of such troops would be to obstruct the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, and the Northern Central Railroad by disabling some of the bridges on both roads. His honor the mayor stated to the board that his excellency the governor, with whom he had a few minutes before been in consultation in the presence of several citizens, concurred in these views; they were likewise those of the board, and instructions were given for carrying them into effect. This was accordingly done. The injury thus done on the railroads amounted to but a few thousand dollars on each; subsequently, as has been stated, further and grater damage was done to other structures on the roads by parties in the country or others, but this was without the sanction or authority of the board, and they have no accurate information on the subject.

The absolute necessity of the measures thus determined upon by the governor, mayor, and police board is fully illustrated by the fact that early on Sunday morning reliable information reached the city of the presence of a large body of Pennsylvania troops, amounting to about twenty-four hundred men, [who] had reached Ashland, near Cockeysville, by the way of the Northern Central Railroad, and were stopped in their progress toward Baltimore by the partial destruction of the Ashland Bridge. Every intelligent citizen at all acquainted with the state of feeling then existing must be satisfied that if these troops had attempted to march through the city an immense loss of life would have ensued in the conflict which would necessarily have taken place. The bitter feelings already engendered would have been intensely increased by such a conflict; all attempts at conciliation would have been vain, and terrible destruction would have been the consequence, if, as is certain, other bodies of troops had insisted upon forcing their way through the city.

The tone of the whole of the Northern press and off the mass of the population was violent in the extreme. Incursions upon our city were daily threatened, not only by troops in the service of the Federal Government, but by the vilest and most reckless desperadoes, acting independently, and, as they threatened, in despite of the Government, backed by well-known, influential citizens, and sworn to the commission of all kinds of excesses. In short, every possible effort was made to alarm this community. In this condition of things the board left it to be their solemn duty to continue the organization which had already been commended for the purpose of assuring the people of Baltimore that no effort would be spared to protect all within its borders to the full extent of their ability. All the means employed were devoted to this end, and with no views of producing a collision with the General government, which the board were particularly anxious to avoid, and an arrangement was happily effected by the mayor with the General Government that no troops should be passed through the city. As an evidence of the determination of the board to prevent such collision, a sufficient guard was sent in the neighborhood of Fort McHenry several nights to arrest all parties who might be engaged in a threatened attack upon it, and a steam-tug was employed, properly manned, to prevent any hostile demonstration upon the receiving-ship Allegheny, lying at anchor in the harbor, of all which the United States officers in command were duly notified.

Property of various descriptions, belonging to the Government and individuals, was taken possession of by the police force with a view to its security. The best care has been taken of it. Every effort has been made to discover the rightful owners, and a portion of it has already been forwarded to order. Arrangements have been made with the Government agents satisfactory to them for the portion belonging to it, and the balance is held subject to the order of its owners.

Amidst all the excitement and confusion which has since prevailed, the board take great pleasure in stating that the good order and peace of the city have been preserved to an extraordinary degree. Indeed, to judge from the accounts given by the press of other past week and up to this date, will compare favorably, as to the protection which persons and property have enjoyed, with any other large city in the United States.

All of which is respectfully submitted.
By order of the board:
CHARLES HOWARD, President.

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No. 3.
Report of Hon. George William Brown, Mayor of Baltimore. [BALTIMORE, May 9(?), 1861.]
To the honorable the General Assembly of Maryland:

In the report recently made to your honorable body by the board of police commissioners of the city of Baltimore it is stated that, in the great emergency which existed in this city on the 19th ultimo, it was suggested that the most feasible, if not the only practicable, mode of stopping for a time the approach of troops to Baltimore was to obstruct the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore and the Northern Central Railroads by disabling some of the bridges on both roads; and it is added that "his honor the mayor stated to the board that his excellency the governor, with whom he had a few minutes before been in consultation, in the presence of several citizens, concurred in these views."

As this concurrence has since been explicitly denied by his Excellency Governor Hicks in an official communication addressed to the senate of Maryland on the 4th instant, which I have just seen, it is due to myself that I should lay before you the grounds on which the statement was made to the board of police, on which they, as well as myself, acted. I seriously regret that so grave a misunderstanding exists between the governor and myself on so important a subject.

On the evening of the 19th ultimo, and after the collision had taken place, I mentioned to Governor Hicks that I had begun to fear it might be necessary to burn the railroad bridges, but I did not then, in consequence of intelligence which had been received, think it would be; to which he replied that he had no authority to give such an order.

At about 11 o'clock p. m. of the same day, the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, George W. Dobbin and John C. Brune, esq., were requested by Governor Hicks and myself to go to Washington in a special train, which was provided for the purpose, to explain in person the condition of things in Baltimore, and to bear the following communications from Governor Hicks and myself, which were addressed to the President:

SIR: The will be presented to you by the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, George W. Dobbin and John C. Brune, esqrs., who will proceed to Washington by an express train at my request in order to explain fully the fearful condition of affairs in this city. The people are exasperated to the highest degree by the passage of troops, and the citizens are universally decided in the opinion that no more should be ordered to come.

The authorities of the city did their best to-day to protect both strangers and citizens, and to prevent any collision, but in vain; and but for their great efforts a fearful slaughter would have occurred. Under these circumstances it is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore, unless the fight their way at every step. I therefore hope and trust, and most earnestly request, that no more troops be permitted or ordered by the Government to pass through the city. If they should attempt it the responsibility for the blood shed will not rest upon me.

With great respect, you obedient servant,
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

The following, from Governor Hicks, was appended to my communication: To his EXCELLENCY ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States: I have been in Baltimore since Tuesday evening last, and co-operated with Mayor G. W. Brown in his untiring efforts to allay and prevent the excitement and suppress the fearful outbreak as indicated above, and I fully concur in all that is said by him in the above communication. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, THOMAS H. HICKS, Governor of Maryland.

At about 12 o'clock p. m. the Hon. E. Louis Lowe and Marshall George P. Kane called at my house, where Governor Hicks was passing the night, and Marshal Kane informed me that a telegram had been received that other troops were to come to Baltimore over the Northern Central Railroad. There was also a report that troops were on their way who, it was thought, might even then be at Perryville, on their way to Baltimore. Mr. Lowe, Marshal Kane, my brother, John Cumming Brune, and myself went immediately to the chamber of Governor Hicks and laid the matter before him. The point was pressed that if troops were suddenly to come to Baltimore with a determination to pass through, a terrible collision and bloodshed would take place, and that the only way to avert the calamity was to destroy the bridges. To this the governor replied, "It seems to be necessary," or words to that effect.

He was then asked by me whether he gave his consent to the destruction of the bridges, and he distinctly, although apparently with great reluctance, replied in the affirmative. I do not assert that I have given the precise language used by Governor Hicks, but I am very clear that I have stated it with substantial correctness, and that his assent was unequivocal, and in answer to a question by me which elicited a distinct affirmative reply.

After this, but before the interview was over, two gentlemen came into the room, both to them strangers to me, but one was introduced as the brother of Governor Hicks, and I am confident that the assent of the governor to the burning of the bridges was repeated in the presence of those gentlemen.

I went immediately from the chamber of the governor to the office to the marshal of police, where Charles Howard, esq., the president of the board of police, was waiting, and reported to him the assent of the governor to the destruction of the bridges.

Mr. Howard, or some one else, made a further inquiry as to what had been said by the governor, whereupon Mr. Lowe, Marshal Kane, and my brother, John C. Brune, all declared that they were present at the interview and heard Governor Hicks give his assent.

The order to destroy the bridges was accordingly given, and carried out in the manner already reported to your honorable body.

I refer to the accompanying statements of Col. Kane and Mr. J. C. Brune in confirmation of the correctness of my recollection of what occurred at the interview with Governor Hicks.

With great respect, your obedient servant,
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

[Inclosure.] POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE MARSHALL,
Baltimore, May 9, 1861.

Near the hour of 12 p. m. of Friday, the 19th April, the day on which the collision with the Massachusetts troops occurred, I received intelligence that the president of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad Company had sent a dispatch to a gentleman here that additional troops would pass through Baltimore on their was to the capital. I immediately sent to the president of the police board the intelligence referred to, and called at the residence of his honor Mayor Brown, to whom I also communicated the information which I had received. The mayor immediately had an interview with the governor, who was then staying at his (mayor's) house, and afterwards invited me to accompany him to the chamber of his excellency, to whom I communicated the information of the purposed coming of the troops.

A general conversation then ensued, in which it was agreed to by all present that any attempt to pass troops through the city, in the then excited condition of the public mind, would lead to the most fearful consequences, and that any such passage must be prevented or delayed. The governor fully accorded in these views.

The conversation resulted in the governor's distinctly an unequivocally consenting, in response to the direct question put to him by the mayor, that the bridges on the roads by which the troops were expected to come should be destroyed as the only means of averting the consequences referred to of their coming at that time.

GEO. P. KANE, Marshal.
BALTIMORE, May 9, 1861.

About 12 o'clock on the night of Friday, 19th April last, I was present when a conversation took place between Governor Hicks and my brother, the mayor of Baltimore, in reference to the best course to be pursued, by which a repetition of the troubles which had occurred on that day could be prevented. It was represented to them by Marshal Kane that troops from the North were on their way to Baltimore, and might by the following morning reach the city.

The destruction of the bridges on the Northern Central and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroads was, in the opinion of my brother, the best and most effective method to obstruct their progress. In this opinion Governor Hicks fully concurred. When asked by my brother whether or not he gave his consent to the measure, the governor expressed a desire for time for reflecting. Being reminded by those present of the lateness of the hour, and the necessity for prompt action, my brother again earnestly appealed to Governor Hicks and asked him for his consent. Governor Hicks' answer was, in substance, although I may not use his exact words, "I see nothing else to be done." "But, sir," said my brother, "I cannot act without your consent; do you give it?" The governor's reply was distinctly given in the affirmative.

J. CUMMING BROWN. Brown should read Brune. Correction from General Index.
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FREDERICK, MD., May 10 [?], 1861. Hon. JOHN C. BROWN: Brown should read Brune.
Correction from General Index.

DEAR SIR: As reference has been made by his honor the mayor of Baltimore City to my knowledge of the facts connected with the interview between him and the governor of Maryland on the night of the 19th ultimo, it gives me pleasure to furnish the desired statement.

I was present between 11 and 12 o'clock p. m. on Friday, the 19th of April, at the residence of a prominent citizen of Baltimore when Marshal Kane, who was one of the company, received information by one of his officers that a telegram had been sent by the president of the railroad company at Philadelphia, announcing the approach of troops to Baltimore. It was the spontaneous opinion of all present that, in the terribly excited condition of the public and, an attempt to pass troops through the city would inevitably lead to a bloody collision, and perhaps to other very serious consequences. It was therefore proposed to repair at once to the office of the marshal of police, and to send immediately for the mayor and governor.

It was supposed at the time that Governor Hicks was stopping at the Fountain Hotel. Marshal Kane asked me to accompany him to Mayor Brown's house, and the other gentleman proceeded to the marshal's office. Marshal Kane and I accordingly went to the mayor's residence, and were admitted by his brother, who said that the mayor had retired. In a few moments the mayor came down to the prior, when Marshal Kane stated to him the substance of the information received, and reminded him of the excited condition of the city, which rendered it imperatively necessary to adopt me prompt and efficient measures to delay the advent of the correctly apprised to the state of affairs, and to arrest the threatened danger. For that purpose the partial destruction of the bridges was suggested. Mayor Brown immediately assented to the suggestion as one of absolute necessity, but said that as mayor of the city his jurisdiction terminated with its corporate limits, and that consequently he could not assume to exercise powers beyond those limits. The mayor added, "The governor, however, is here, and I will go up and see him." In a few moments he returned and said that Governor Hicks was not well and would there fore receive us in his room. Immediately upon entering the room Mayor Brown and Marshal Kane gave to governor Hicks a full statement of the matter and solicited his authority to destroy the bridges. Governor Hicks replied that it was a serious affair to undertake to destroy the bridges, and he expressed some doubt as to his authority to give such an order. It was urged in reply that it was a case of absolute self-preservation; that in three or four hours' time a large body of troops would probably be in the city inflamed with passionate resentment against the people of Baltimore for the assault made on their comrades in the Pratt-street encounter, and that as the city was filled hundreds of excited men, armed to the teeth, and determined to resist the passage of troops, a fearful slaughter must necessarily ensue, and the safety of the city itself be put in peril, unless by the destruction of the bridges time could be gained to avoid the difficult by peaceable arrangement of some sort. Governor Hicks fully and most distinctly assented to all this, and said, "Well, I suppose it must be done," or words of precisely that import, to which the mayor replied, substantially, "Governor, I have no authority to act beyond the city limits, and can do nothing in this matter except by your direction; shall the bridges be destroyed?" Governer Hicks emphatically and distinctly replied in the affirmative. It is absolutely impossible for any misapprehension to exist on this point.

The mayor, Marshal Kane, and I then proceeded to the marshal's office, where we found several highly respectable citizens gathered, to whom the mayor and marshal gave a statement of their interview with the governor. The mayor then issued written orders for the destruction of the bridges. The next morning I learned by the newspaper extras that the orders had been carried into effect.

Respectfully, yours, &c.,
E. LOUIS LOWE.

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No. 4.
Extracts from the message of the Mayor of Baltimore. [BALTIMORE, July 11, 1861.]
To the honorable the Members of the First and Second Branches of the City Council:

GENTLEMEN:
* * * * *
On the 19th of April last an attack was made by a mob in the streets of Baltimore on several companies of a regiment of Massachusetts troops, who were on their way to the city of Washington in pursuance of a call for 75,000 men made by the President of the United States.

On the day previous troops had been safely passed through the city under the escort of the police. In the afternoon of the same day (18th) the regiments from Massachusetts were expected, and provision was made by the police for their reception; but they did not arrive, and the board of police could not ascertain when they would come, although two of the members of the board went in person to the station of the Philadelphia Railroad Company to obtain the necessary information.

On the morning of the 19th, about 10 o'clock, I was at my law office engaged in the performance of professional business, when three members of the city council came to me with a message form Marshal Kane, to the effect that he had just learned that the troops were about to arrive, and that he apprehended some disturbance. I immediately hastened to the board of police and gave notice. George M. Gill, esq., counselor of the city, and myself got into a carriage, and drove rapidly to the Camden station, and the police commissioners followed without delay. On reaching Camden station we found marshal Kane in attendance, and the police coming in squads to the spot. The plan of the against of the railroad companies was that the troops which were to no way be conveyed through the city, and be transferred to the cars for Washington at the Camden-street station. Accordingly, the police were requested by the agent of the road to be in attendance at the latter station. After considerable delay the troops began to arrive, and were transferred, under the direction of the police, to the Washington cars large and angry crowd assembled, but the transfer was safely effected. No one could tell whether more troops were expected or not. At this time an alarm was given that a mob was about to tear up the rails in advance of the train on the Washington road, and Marshal Kane ordered some of his men to go out on the road as far as the Relay House, if necessary, to protect the track.

Soon afterwards, and when I was about to leave the station, supposing all danger to be over, news was brought to Commissioner Davis and myself, who were standing together, that other troops were left at the President-street station, and that the mob was tearing up the track on Pratt street. Mr. Davis immediately ran to summon a body of police to be sent to Pratt street, while I hastened alone down Pratt street towards President-street station. On arriving at the head of Smith's wharf I found that anchors had been piled on the track so as to obstruct it, and Sergeant McComas and a few policemen who were with him were not allowed by the mob to remove the obstruction. I at once ordered the anchors to be removed, and my authority was not resisted.

On approaching Pratt-street bridge I saw several companies of Massachusetts troops, who had left the cars, moving in column, some persons in the crowd shouting, as I approached, "Here comes the mayor." I shook hands with the officer in command, saying, as I did so, "I am the mayor of Baltimore." I then placed myself by his side and marched with him as far as the head of Light-street wharf, doing what I could by my presence and personal efforts to allay the tumult. The mob grew bolder and the attack became more violent. Various persons were killed and wounded on both sides. The troops has some time previously begun to fire in self-defense, and the firing, as the attack increased in violence became more general.

At last, when I found that my presence was of no use, either in preventing the contest or saving life, I left the head of the column, but immediately after I did so Marshal Kane, with about fifty policemen, from the direction of the Camden station, rushed to the rear of the troops, forming a line across the street and with drawn revolvers checking and keeping off the mob. The movement, which I saw myself, was perfectly successful and gallantly performed. I submit herewith Marshal Kane's account of the affair, published on the 4th of May last,* which substantially agrees with my own.

It is doing bare justice to say that the board of police, the marshal of police, and the men under his command, exerted themselves bravely, efficiently, skillfully, and in good faith to preserve the peace and protect life. If proper notice had been given of the arrival of the troops and of the number expected, the outbreak might have been prevented entirely; and but for the timely arrival of Marshal Kane with his force, as I have described, the bloodshed would have been great. The wounded among the troops received the care and medical attention at the expense of the city, and the bodies of the killed were carefully and respectfully returned to their friends. The facts which I witnessed myself, and all that I have since heard, satisfy me that the attack was the result of a sudden impulse, and not of a premeditated scheme. But the effect on our citizens was for a time uncontrollable. In the intense excitement which ensued, which lasted for many days, and which was shared by men of all parties, and by our volunteer soldiers as well as citizens, it would have been impossible to convey more troops from the North through the city without a severe fight and bloodshed. Such an occurrence would have been fatal to the city, and accordingly to prevent it the bridges on the Northern Central Railroad and on the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad were, with the consent of the governor and by my order, with the co-operation of the board of police (except Mr. Charles D. Hinks, who was absent from the city), partially disabled and burned, so as to prevent the immediate approach of troops to the city, but with no purpose of hostility to the Federal Government. This act, with the motive which prompted it, has been reported by the board of police to the legislature of the State and approved by that body, and was also immediately communicated by me in person to the President of the United States and his Cabinet. I inclose a copy of the report made by the board of police to the legislature on the 3d of May last.+

On the evening of the 19th of April, a portion of the military of the city were called out. On the 20th of April, your honorable body, by a unanimous vote, placed at my disposal the sum of $500,000 for the defense of the city, and the banks, with great patriotism and unanimity, voluntarily offered to advance the money through a committee of their presidents, consisting of Messrs. Columbus O'Donnell, Johns Hopkins, and John Clark, who notified me, in person, of the fact, on the morning of the 20th of April, at the mayor's office. A number of citizens in all the wards volunteered for the purpose of defense, and were enrolled under the direction of the board of police; and for their use arms were partially provided. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the United States, with the approbation of the President, in view of the condition of affairs then existing in the city, on the earnest application of the governor of the State, of prominent citizens, and myself, ordered that hereafter the troops should not be brought through Baltimore, and they were accordingly transported to Washington by way of Annapolis. But great danger existed to Baltimore from large bodies of unauthorized men at the North, who threatened to cut their way through the city, and visit upon it terrible vengeance for the acts of the 19th of April.

As soon as this danger had passed away, and the excitement among our own citizens had sufficiently subsided, the military were dismissed, and the citizens who enrolled were disbanded by order of the board of police. The peace of the city had been preserved, and its safety and the persons and property of men, and men of all parties, protected under the circumstances of great peril and the most intense excitement, and it was hoped that affairs would be allowed to return as nearly as possible to their previous condition. Large bodies of troops from the North have ever since passed through the city without molestation, and every proper precaution to accomplish that object was taken by the board of police, and carried out by the force.

But civil war had begun on the immediate border of our State. A great division of opinion in regard to it existed among the people, and the events which had occurred in the city, and their consequences, seem to have made an indelible impression on the minds of the authorities at Washington that the police force of the city of Baltimore was prepared to engage in hostility against the General Government whenever an opportunity should occur.

The result has been very unfortunate. On the ground of military necessity, of the existence of which and of the measures required of it the Federal officers claim to be the sole judges, our city has been occupied by large bodies of troops in its central points; picket guards have been stationed along many of our streets; the arms provided by the city for its defense and those left by private individuals with the authorities for safe-keeping, the station-houses and other property of the city have been displaced and others substituted in their stead; the marshal of police and the board of police, with the exception of myself, have been arrested and are now imprisoned in Fort McHenry, one only, who is in bad health, has been released on his parole; the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended; the police, without authority of law, has been established under the control of a marshal appointed by the commanding general, and all power to hold elections in the city has been for the present set aside by suspending the functions of the board under which alone elections can lawfully be held.

The grounds taken by Maj.-Gen. Banks as a justification for these proceedings, and the position assumed by the boards of police, respectively, will be found in the proclamations of the general an the protest of the board, which I inclose.* The hidden deposits of arms and ammunition referred to in the proclamation of June 27 are, I suppose, those found in the city hall, in reference to which a few words of explanation may be made. The arms consisted in part of muskets which belonged to the old police, established under the administration of Mr. Swann; of revolvers procured for the police, and of some rifles, carbines, &c., lately procured in part for the use of the police and in part for the defense of the city. The board of police considered it proper that there should be a sufficient number of efficient weapons to arm the entire police force in case of an emergency. There were not enough in the city hall for that purpose. An allegation has been made that some of the arms and ammunition belonged to the Massachusetts troops; but I am informed that this is not the case, except as to two muskets which were taken by the police from the hands of the mob. The ammunition at that hall, which was purchased for the defense of the city, was more than was entirely safe. Of this I was well aware, and should have ordered it to be removed if the city had any proper place of deposit; but I apprehended that any attempt at removal at this time would only lead to a seizure on the part of the officers of the General Government and to unfounded rumors and suspicions; for all the rest of the arms and ammunition belonging to the city, and all the arms left with the city authorities for safe-keeping, which were placed in depositories procured expressly for the purpose and in no way concealed, had been previously seized by the authorities of the United States under circumstances very mortifying to the pride of the people. That some of the arms and ammunition were concealed about the building is sufficient explained by the fact that the officers in charge desired to secure them from seizure, but such concealment was made without my knowledge.

The proclamation charges the existence of unlawful combinations of men organized for the resistance to the laws, for accumulating hidden deposits of arms, and encouraging contraband trade.

Although I am only ex officio member of the board, and by reason of other engagements not able to be present at all their meetings, yet, from the free and full interchange of views among us, and the custom edge of all their proceedings, I feel that I have a right to say, of my own personal knowledge, that the board had no notice or information of any such combination, if any such existed, which I have no reason to suspect.

Indeed, my experience of the fidelity of the board to its legal obligations during my whole official connection with it, and the common understanding between myself and my colleagues as to our course of duty since the present troubles began, justify me in saying that if any organization in this city for resistance to the laws could have been discovered by proper vigilance they would have been found out and suppressed to the extent of the powers conferred on the board by law.

After the board of police had been superseded, and its members arrested by the order of Gen. Banks, I proposed, in order to relieve the serious complications which had arisen, to proceed, as the only member left free to act, to exercise the power of the board as far as an individual member could do so. Marshal Kane, while he objected to the propriety of this course, was prepared to place his resignation in my hands whenever I should request it; and the majority of the board interposed no objection to my pursuing such course at I might deem it right and proper to adopt in view of the existing circumstances, and upon my own responsibility, until the board should be enabled to resume the exercise of its functions.

If this arrangement could have been effected it would have continued in the exercise of their duties the police force, which is lawfully enrolled, and which has won the confidence and applause of all good citizens by its fidelity and impartiality at all times and under all circumstances. But the arrangement was not satisfactory to the Federal authorities.

As the men of the police force, through no fault of theirs, are now prevented from discharging their duty, their pay constitutes a legal claim on the city, form which, in my opinion, it cannot be relieved.

The new force which has been enrolled is in direct violation of the law of the State; and no money can be appropriated by the city for its support without incurring the heavy penalties provided by the act of assembly. Officers in the fire-alarm and police telegraph department, who are appointed by the mayor and city council and not by the board of police, have been discharged, and others have been substituted in their place.

I mention these facts with profound sorrow, and with no purpose whatever of increasing the difficulties unfortunately existent in this city, but because it is your right to be acquainted with the true condition of affairs, and because I cannot help entertaining the hope that redress will yet be afforded by the authorities of the United States upon suspicion entertained of any meditated hostility on the part of the city authorities against the General Government is wholly unfounded, and, with the best means of knowledge, express the confident belief and conviction that there is no organization of any kind among the people for such a purpose. I have no doubt that the officers of the United States have acted on information, which they deemed reliable, obtained form our own citizens, some of whom may be deluded by their fears, while others are actuated by baser motives; but suspicions thus derived be grave and alarming violations of the rights of individual citizens, of the city of Baltimore, and of the State of Maryland.

Very respectfully,
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

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No. 5.
Statement of George M. Gill.
BALTIMORE, July 12, 1861.
Hon. GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor of the City of Baltimore:

In your communication to the city council of yesterday, which I did not see until after it was communicated to the council, you refer to the fact that I accompanied you on Friday, April 19, to the Camden station. There were some additional circumstances which I deem it proper to state. You desired me to accompany you, hoping that I might aid in preventing any violence on that day, or interruption to the troops then about to pass through, in case any should be attempted. Your impression was that no such attempt would be made, but nevertheless you thought every precaution should be taken, in case of any such attempt, to resist it. For the sole purpose of doing this I accompanied you.

After we reached the Camden station there were manifestations of excitement among the crowd their assembled, and the police commissioners (expecting Mr. Hinks, then absent from the city) gave directions to Marshal Kane, in my presence, to use his whole force in keeping order and protecting the troops from being interrupted. The reply of Marshal Kane then made was, that if he and his whole force lost their lived the troops should be protected.

After the first of the troops reached Camden station a rush of people was made at the cars in which they then were, but the police interfered and drove them off. A cry was then raised to tear up the track outside of the Camden station, and a rush was made to accomplish this purpose; but the police again interfered, and prevented this from being done.

I supposed for some time that all the troops would pass in safety, and such was my anxious wish, and to the extent of my ability I united in the effort to produce this result.

While I was at Camden station the events on Pratt street took place, none of which did I see, and therefore cannot speak of them further than I saw at a distance, and heard the firing of the troops as they passed up Pratt street.

My impression on that day was and still is that the events arose from a sudden impulse which seized upon some of our people, and that after the firing commenced and blood was shed many persons took part under an impression that the troops were killing our people, and without knowing the circumstances of provocation which induced the troops to fire. Matters reached their height after Mr. Davis was killed, and the intense excitement resulting from this and other causes produced a state of feeling which for a time was beyond control on the part of the city authorities.

On Sunday, the 21st of April, whilst you were in Washington, where you had been summoned by the President, a regiment arrived from Pennsylvania, but were fortunately stopped at Cockeysville, about 14 miles off, by the disabled bridge at that point. Any rational man who witnessed the condition of things in Baltimore on that day can judge of the sad consequences which would have followed if the regiment had entered the city.

Yours, very respectfully,
GEO. M. GILL.

Source: Official Records
CHAP. IX.] RIOT IN BALTIMORE, MD. PAGE 7-2
[Series I. Vol. 2. Serial No. 2.]